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Michael K. Reer† and Valerie Antonette†† 
 
I. RECENT OIL AND GAS ACTIVITY IN WEST VIRGINIA1 
West Virginia is one of the most prolific energy-producing states in 
the country. According to the U.S. Energy Information 
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production of natural gas in 2018, contributing 1.8 trillion cubic feet.2 
Further, the consistency in permit application appears to support the 
proposition that West Virginia operators will continue producing 
significant volumes well in the future. The West Virginia Department 
of Environmental Protection (“WVDEP”) issued 582 horizontal well 
permits in 2015, 223 in 2016, 509 in 2017, 433 in 2018, and 467 in 
2019.3  
II. LEGISLATIVE UPDATES 
The West Virginia Legislature is a bicameral body that holds 
regular sixty-day sessions each year, generally beginning on the 
second Wednesday in January.4 The 2020 Regular Session was 
particularly active with respect to bills relating to oil and gas 
development.  
A. HB 4217 Changes Spacing Requirements for Deep Wells 
On March 25, 2020, Governor Jim Justice signed HB 4217 into law, 
which authorizes a legislative rule of the Oil and Gas Conservation 
Commission (the “Commission”) amending the minimum spacing 
requirements for deep wells in West Virginia.5 The Commission 
regulates the development of deep wells in West Virginia.6 Deep wells 
are those drilled to a depth below the top of the uppermost member of 
the Onondaga Group, which includes Utica wells.7 
Previously, the Commission’s rules required minimum spacing of 
3,000 feet between deep wells.8 On June 14, 2019, the Commission 
filed an emergency rule to change the minimum spacing requirements, 
 
 2. West Virginia State Profile and Energy Estimates, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.eia.gov/state/?sid=WV#tabs-3  
[https://perma.cc/9JKT-STBM].  
 3. Horizontal Drilling, W. VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., https://dep.wv.gov/oil-
and-gas/Horizontal-Permits/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/5VRZ-SBDA] 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
 4. Citizen’s Guide to the Legislature, W. VA. LEGISLATURE, 
https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Educational/citizens/process.cfm#:~:text=On%20th
e%20first%20day%20of,with%20the%20state’s%20budget%20bill 
[https://perma.cc/LUG6-3JNN] (last visited June 5, 2020). 
 5. W. VA. CODE § 64-3-2 (2020). 
 6. Mission, OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION, 
https://ogcc.wv.gov/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/M649-5J9S] (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2020). 
 7. W. VA. CODE R. § 39-1-2 (2020). 
 8. Notice of an Emergency Rule June 14, 2019 (codified with some differences 
in language at W. VA. CODE. R. § 39-1-4.2.1.a (2020)). 
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noting that 3,000-foot spacing is “impractical and uneconomical” and 
that, on a practical basis, “every company desiring to hydraulically 
fracture a formation below the top of the Onondaga must formally 
request a public hearing before the Commission to obtain an exception 
to the existing 3,000-foot rule [and] bring witnesses to Charleston to 
build a record that supports and justifies each requested exception.”9 
The final rules, confirmed by HB 4217, require that in the absence 
of an exception (also known as an operational order) or field rules, 
deep wells must adhere to the following spacing restrictions: (1) no 
less than 1,000 feet from the productive interval measured 
perpendicularly from a previously permitted deep well operated by a 
different operator; (2) no less than 800 feet from the productive 
interval measured perpendicularly from a previously permitted deep 
well operated by the same operator; (3) no less than 500 feet from a 
lease or unit boundary measured perpendicularly for wells where the 
adjoining lease or unit is operated by a different operator; and (4) no 
less than 400 feet from a lease or unit boundary measured 
perpendicularly for wells where the adjoining lease or unit is operated 
by the same operator.10 In addition, the distance between the 
productive interval nearest the heel or toe to a new deep well may not 
be less than 150 feet from the productive interval nearest the heel or 
toe of a previously permitted deep well and no less than seventy-five 
feet from a lease or unit boundary.11 
B. SB 554 Requires Lessees to Release Terminated Leases 
SB 554, effective May 31, 2020, requires lessees to deliver a 
properly executed and notarized release (in recordable form and 
without cost to the lessor) of leases that have terminated, expired, or 
been canceled.12 Lessees must deliver the notarized release to lessors 
within sixty days of lease termination, expiration, or cancellation.13  
If the lessee fails to provide a timely release, the lessor may provide 
notice to the lessee of the lessee’s failure to provide the required 
release.14 The notice must include a statement that the lease is 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. W. VA. CODE R. § 39-1-4.2.2.a.1 to 4, 6 (2020) (Operators may agree, in 
writing, to waive the greater spacing limitations applicable to wells operated by 
different operators and instead adhere to the spacing limitations applicable to wells 
operated by the same operator). 
 11. § 4.2.2.a.5. 
 12. W. VA. CODE § 36-4-9b(a) (2020). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. § 36-4-9b(b). 
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terminated, expired, or canceled according to its terms (including the 
date of termination, expiration, or cancellation), that the lessee has a 
duty to provide a release, and that if the release, or a written dispute to 
such termination, expiration, or cancellation, is not received by the 
lessor within sixty days from receipt of the notice, the lessor has the 
right to file an affidavit of termination, expiration, or cancellation.15 
The notice must also include: (1) the name and address of the lessor; 
(2) a brief description of the land covered by the lease; (3) the name 
or API number of any well on the land covered by the lease (if known 
to the lessor); (4) the name of any unit that includes land covered by 
the lease (if known to the lessor); (5) the recording information 
regarding the lease (or memorandum of lease), execution date of the 
lease, and the identity of the original lessor and lessee under the lease; 
and (6) a service sheet showing the names and addresses of all persons 
upon whom the notice has been served.16 The notice must be sent to 
the lessee, all other lessors, and all other persons who have an interest 
in the leasehold estate or the oil and natural gas leased thereunder.17 
After receiving notice, if the lessee disputes in good faith that the 
oil or natural gas lease is terminated, expired, or canceled as stated in 
the notice, within sixty days of receiving the notice, the lessee must 
deliver a written dispute of the contents of the notice to the lessor, 
detailing the good-faith basis for such dispute.18  
A lessor who serves notice, but fails to receive a timely dispute from 
the lessee, may record an affidavit of termination, expiration, or 
cancellation in the office of the county clerk.19 An affidavit of 
termination, expiration, or cancellation must contain: (1) the name and 
address of the affiant; (2) the names and addresses of the lessor and 
lessee; (3) if located in a unit, the name of the unit, if known to the 
affiant; (4) if there is a well on the land, the name or API number of 
the well, if known to the affiant; (5) the recording information for the 
lease (or memorandum of lease), the execution date of the lease, and 
 
 15. Id. § 36-4-9(b)(1)(A)–(C).  
 16. Id. § 36-4-9b(b)(2)–(7). 
 17. Id. § 36-4-9b(c) (stating that “A lessor’s inability to afford notice to everyone 
to whom notice is to be given thereunder does not relieve a lessee of its obligation 
to respond”); see also id. § 36-4-9b(d) (stating that “Service of notice under 
subsections (b) and (c) of this section shall be effected either personally or by 
certified mail to the recipient’s last known business address, or, if service cannot 
reasonably be made by those means, by publication once a week for two weeks in a 
newspaper of general circulation in the county or counties in which the lands covered 
by the lease are located”). 
 18. Id. § 36-4-9b(e).  
 19. Id. § 36-4-9b(f).  
  
460 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
the names of the original lessors and lessees; (6) a brief recitation of 
the facts known to the affiant relating to the termination, expiration, 
or cancellation of the lease, including relevant dates; (7) a statement 
that the lessor complied with the duty to serve proper notice to the 
lessee and that the lessee failed to provide a timely challenge to the 
notice (the affidavit must attach a copy of the notice made and served); 
and (8) the notarized signature of the affiant.20  
A person filing an affidavit must provide service of the affidavit 
upon all persons who received the notice. The filing of an affidavit 
does not constitute a modification of a lease, or limit, waive, or 
prejudice any claim or defense of any party to the lease.21 
C. Legislature Addresses Expedited Permits, the Abandoned Well 
Plugging Fund, and Unknown Royalty Owners 
On February 18, 2020, Governor Justice signed HB 4091 into law, 
which provides a process for operators to receive expedited permits 
and expedited permit modifications for certain horizontal production 
wells.22 Expedited permits and expedited permit modifications are not 
available for deep wells.23  
To file an expedited permit application, the operator must pay an 
additional fee of $20,000 for an initial horizontal well and $10,000 for 
each additional horizontal well proposed for the same pad.24 Upon 
receipt of the permit application, WVDEP must issue or deny an 
expedited permit within forty-five days unless WVDEP seeks 
additional information or modification from the applicant, which tolls 
the forty-five-day period until WVDEP receives the requested 
information.25 For each day WVDEP exceeds the allotted time 
approving or denying the expedited permit application, the agency 
must refund $1,333.33 for an initial well and $666.66 for additional 
wells proposed on the same pad until the expedited fee is reduced to 
the normal permit fee amount.26 
 
 20. Id. § 36-4-9b(g).  
 21. Id. § 36-4-9b(h). 
 22. See id. §§ 22-6A-7(h)(1)–(3), (i)(1)–(3). 
 23. Id. §§ 22-6A-7(h)(1), (i)(1); see also § 22C-9-2(a)(12) (defining “deep 
wells” as those drilled to a depth below the top of the uppermost member of the 
Onondaga Group, and including Utica wells). 
 24. W. VA. CODE § 22-6A-7(h)(1). 
 25. Id. § 22-6A-7(h)(2). 
 26. Id. § 22-6A-7(h)(3). 
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 To file an expedited permit modification application, the operator 
must pay an additional fee of $5,000 for each horizontal well.27 Upon 
receipt of the permit application, WVDEP must issue or deny an 
expedited permit within twenty days unless WVDEP seeks additional 
information or modification from the applicant, which tolls the 
twenty-day period until WVDEP receives the requested information.28 
For each day WVDEP exceeds the allotted time for approving or 
denying the expedited permit application, the agency must refund 
$500 per day.29 
On March 23, 2020, Governor Justice signed HB 4090 into law, 
which lowered the severance tax on certain marginally producing oil 
and gas wells30 and created the Oil and Gas Abandoned Well Plugging 
Fund.31 Specifically, HB 4090 lowered the severance tax rate on wells 
(excluding wells utilizing horizontal drilling techniques targeting 
shale formations) that produced an average between 5,000 and 60,000 
cubic feet of natural gas per day during the calendar year immediately 
preceding the beginning date of a given taxable year.32 On applicable 
wells, HB 4090 lowered the severance tax from 5% to 2.5% of the 
gross value of production as shown by the gross proceeds derived from 
the sale.33 HB 4090 requires placement of the 2.5% severance tax into 
the newly created Oil and Gas Abandoned Well Plugging Fund, which 
is designed to fund WVDEP efforts to plug and reclaim abandoned oil 
and gas wells without a responsible operator.34 
On March 25, 2020, Governor Justice signed HB 4088 into law, 
which allows certain unclaimed funds related to oil and gas interests 
to be deposited into the newly-created Oil and Gas Reclamation 
Fund.35 Under preexisting provisions codified in Chapter 55, Article 
12A (“Lease and Conveyance of Mineral Interests Owned by Missing 
or Unknown Owners or Abandoning Owners”), if an owner of a 
 
 27. Id. § 22-6A-7(i)(1). 
 28. Id. § 22-6A-7(i)(2). 
 29. Id. § 22-6A-7(i)(3).  
 30. Id. § 11-13A-3a. 
 31. Id. § 22-6-29a. 
 32. Id. § 11-13A-3a(b)(2). For oil wells, the severance decrease applies to wells 
(excluding wells utilizing horizontal drilling techniques targeting shale formations) 
that produced an average between one-half barrel per day and 10 barrels per day, 
during the calendar year immediately preceding the beginning date of a given 
taxable year. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. § 37-4-9.  
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mineral interest leased through a special commissioner’s lease36 
remains unknown or missing, or does not disavow abandonment, for 
a period of seven years from the date of the special commissioner’s 
lease, the party that received the unclaimed funds must report the 
funds as unclaimed to the court.37 If the owners of the surface estate 
present proof of ownership in fee of the surface estate, the court must 
order the special commissioner to convey the mineral interest to the 
surface owners.38 Until HB 4088, the court also awarded the 
unclaimed funds attributable to the mineral interest to the surface 
owners.39 However, HB 4088 now directs that these funds be paid to 
the Oil and Gas Reclamation Fund, which is used to reclaim and plug 
abandoned wells that have either been inadequately plugged or never 
plugged at all.40 
III. OIL AND GAS LITIGATION 
In the past year, significant decisions concerning oil and gas title 
and lease issues have been issued by the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia.  
A. West Virginia Supreme Court Holds Joint Operating 
Agreements May Create Partnerships 
In Northeast Natural Energy LLC v. Pachira Energy LLC, the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia determined that a joint 
operating agreement (“JOA”) creating an area of mutual interest 
(“AMI”) may result in a partnership under the Uniform Partnership 
Act. By way of background, Northeast and Pachira created the 
Blacksville AMI, which the two parties jointly owned 75%–25% 
through a JOA and for which Northeast acted as the operator.41 The 
Blacksville AMI included a water system used to transport water from 
the Monongahela River to wells inside the AMI.42 Pachira learned that 
Northeast intended to use the water system to transport water from the 
Monongahela River to wells outside the AMI and to sell water to third 
 
 36. See id. § 55-12A-7. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. § 22-6-29(b)(1). 
 41. Ne. Nat. Energy LLC v. Pachira Energy LLC, 844 S.E.2d 133, 136 (W. VA. 
2020). 
 42. Id.  
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parties outside the AMI.43 Pachira received a preliminary injunction 
from the circuit court enjoining Northeast from using the AMI water 
system to transport and sell water to third parties for use outside of the 
AMI.44 
In upholding the injunction, the Supreme Court of Appeals found 
that Pachira made a substantial case before the circuit court indicating 
that the parties formed a water system partnership and rejected 
Northeast’s argument that the parties owned the water system as 
tenants in common.45 Specifically, the Supreme Court of Appeals 
relied on the broad definition of “partnership” found in the Partnership 
Act: “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners 
a business for profit . . . whether or not the persons intend to form a 
partnership.”46 Further, the Court noted that property purchased with 
partnership funds, such as the AMI water system, “is presumed to be 
partnership property, notwithstanding the name in which title is 
held.”47 
The Court also rejected Northeast’s argument that Pachira did not 
demonstrate irreparable harm because Pachira could be compensated 
with money damages if Pachira succeeded on the merits of its claims. 
The Court instead held that “the term irreparable does not always mean 
what it seems to signify, that is, a physical impossibility of 
reparation.”48 The Court held that an “irreparable injury is one that is 
actual and imminent, and it is likely that the past offensive conduct 
will recur.”49 Significantly, the Court also noted that the Partnership 
Act “charges a partner with a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the 
partnership and to other partners” and that breach of a partner’s 
fiduciary duty of loyalty also supports injunctive relief.50 
B. Supreme Court of Appeals Applies Equitable Defenses to Settle 
Title Issues 
In EQT Prod. Co. v. Taschler, the Supreme Court of Appeals upheld 
a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a landowner 
who sought to quiet title to certain mineral interests in Ritchie County. 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 137. 
 45. Id. at 138. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 139. 
 48. Id. at 140. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 140. 
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The facts of Taschler are somewhat unique: the tract at issue was 
subject to a 1905 lease.51 In 1985, the landowner’s predecessor in 
interest filed an action to challenge the validity of the 1905 lease and 
received a default judgment.52 In 2015, the defendant executed a 
“ratified lease agreement” (as lessee) with “an heir of the predecessor 
in title of the original lessor” (as lessor) under the 1905 lease.53 The 
landowner filed suit in 2016 to quiet title.54 
The defendant argued that the 1985 default judgment “ha[d] no 
legal force or effect and [was] not binding upon [the defendant] 
because the mineral owner/lessor and lessee were not joined as parties 
in that action.”55 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the grant of summary 
judgment, among other reasons, because “given the passing of thirty-
six years since entry of the default judgment, [the defendant] was 
estopped, pursuant to the doctrine of laches, from asserting any 
arguments regarding the impropriety of the default judgment awarded 
. . . .”56 
The Court also upheld the application of laches to a title dispute in 
Van Camp v. McIntyre. In Van Camp, the will at issue, given effect in 
1910, allowed a trustee to sell a specific tract provided that the trustee 
retain the mineral rights and convey them to the beneficiary of the 
residue clause.57 The trustee sold the tract in 1910 but failed to reserve 
the mineral rights.58 The successors in interest to the beneficiary under 
the residue clause brought suit in 2016, claiming (in part) that the 
trustee violated the limitation in the will by not reserving the mineral 
rights.59 The circuit court granted summary judgment against the 
successors in interest on the basis of laches, and the Supreme Court of 
Appeals upheld the grant of summary judgment, finding that “the 
expiration of over 100 years from [the] conveyance mandated the 
application of the doctrine of laches to preclude the claim by the 
petitioners.”60 
 
 51. EQT Prod. Co. v. Taschler, No. 19-0370, 2020 WL 3407766, at *1 (W. Va. 
June 18, 2020). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at *2. 
 55. Id. at *1. 
 56. Id. at *3. 
 57. Van Camp v. McIntyre, No. 18-0760, 2020 WL 877817, at *1–2 (Va. Feb. 
24, 2020). 
 58. Id. at *2. 
 59. Id. at *3. 
 60. Id. at *4. 
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In June 2020, the Court upheld the grant of a summary judgment in 
U.S. Exploration, LLC v. Griffin Producing Co., among other reasons, 
on the basis of unclean hands. In Griffin, the lessee (a family-owned 
company named Magnum) was the subject of a hotly contested 
divorce proceeding between the president and vice-president.61 The 
Magnum vice-president purported to convey the 4,000 acre oil and gas 
lease at issue to a company he solely owned (U.S. Exploration), but 
the conveyance was not immediately recorded.62 Subsequently, the 
Magnum president executed a partial release of the lease at issue, and 
the partial release was recorded first-in-time.63 
The Court expressed some concern regarding the “troubling 
question” of whether the Magnum president and vice-president 
executed conveyances in conflict with the equitable distribution order 
in the divorce proceeding.64 The Court noted the general rule in West 
Virginia: 
 
When a party to a divorce case undertakes—before the 
final order of equitable distribution in the case is 
effective—to transfer real property to a third party 
having actual knowledge of the divorce proceedings, 
the transfer is effective only to the extent it does not 
conflict with the equitable distribution order unless the 
other party to the divorce joins in the transfer. To the 
extent the attempted transfer conflicts with the order of 
equitable distribution and there is evidence that the 
transfer was made to avoid application of the equitable 
distribution statutes or was otherwise a fraudulent 
conveyance, it is void.65 
 
Despite the general rule and the Court’s identification of the “troubling 
question,” no facts in evidence demonstrated whether the partial 
release violated an order in the divorce proceeding or even whether 
the divorce proceeding was ongoing at the time of the partial release.66 
 
 61. U.S. Expl. v. Griffin, No. 18-0847, 2020 WL 3163644, at *1, *2 (W. Va. 
2020). 
 62. Id. at *2–3. 
 63. Id. at *3. 
 64. Id. at *8. 
 65. Id. at *8 (quoting Syl. Pt. 7, Whiteside v. Whiteside, 663 S.E.2d 631 (W.Va. 
2008)). 
 66. Id. 
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Irrespective of whether an order in the divorce proceeding would 
have prohibited the conveyance of marital or corporate assets 
(including the partial release executed by the president), the Court 
found that the vice president and U.S. Exploration violated the general 
rule first “and cannot now complain that [the president] subsequently 
violated it by executing” the partial release.67 Stated another way: “we 
believe that the doctrine of unclean hands prohibits [the vice-
president], and by extension U.S. Exploration, a company he owns, 
from raising this issue.”68 Therefore, the Court upheld the circuit 
court’s ruling effectuating the partial release under the West Virginia 
race-notice provisions.69 
C.  Supreme Court of Appeals Construes Royalty Reservation 
In Haught Family Trust v. Williamson, the Supreme Court of 
Appeals upheld a circuit court interpretation of a deed that reserved 
“one half of the proceeds of all gas [that] may be produced from said 
tract of land” as a reservation of a royalty interest and not as a 
reservation of any oil and gas in place. In upholding the circuit court 
interpretation, the Supreme Court of Appeals relied on the long-
standing general rule in Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., which 
provides that “the words ‘when produced’ [do not speak] in terms of 
an interest in the oil and gas then in place, but rather of the royalty 
interest which would follow production of oil or gas, or both.”70 
D. Fourth Circuit Reverses Southern District on Lease 
Interpretation 
In Lucey v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded an order 
granting a motion to dismiss issued by the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of West Virginia.  
The facts and legal controversy in Lucey are not complex: the 
primary term of the lease ended on August 21, 2011.71 The lessors 
filed suit after the end of the primary term, alleging that the lease had 
 
 67. Id. at *9.  
 68. Id. at *8.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Haught Family Trust v. Williamson, No. 19-0368, 2020 WL 1911459 (W. 
Va. Apr. 20, 2020); see also Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 81 (W. Va. 1963). 
 71. Lucey v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, 786 Fed. Appx. 394, 395 (4th Cir. 
Oct. 1, 2019). 
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terminated.72 The parties entered into a settlement agreement with an 
effective date of October 29, 2012.73 As part of the settlement 
agreement, the lessee received a new leasehold interest, and the lessee 
agreed to pay the lessors “an additional $500.00/acre . . . if there [was] 
not a commencement of two [] wells within one [] year of the effective 
date of this agreement.”74 Prior to October 29, 2013, the lessee pooled 
the leased acreage with four off-tract wells commenced prior to the 
effective date of the settlement agreement.75 
As discussed by the Fourth Circuit, “the only issue . . . is whether 
the condition precedent for [the lessee] to avoid paying [a]dditional 
[c]onsideration required that [the lessee] commence two wells at any 
time before October 29, 2013, or whether it required that [the lessee] 
commence two wells between October 29, 2012 (the effective date of 
the [s]ettlement [a]greement) and October 29, 2013.”76  
The district court determined that the settlement agreement only 
required the commencement of two wells at any time before October 
29, 2013.77 In reversing, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court’s 
decision rendered the additional compensation provision superfluous:  
 
The district court ruled that the former was the 
unambiguous intent of the parties. We reject this 
finding. Applying the district court’s reasoning, the 
wells had already been commenced at the time the 
Settlement Agreement was executed. Thus, the 
condition precedent to Chesapeake owing no further 
compensation had already been met. As such, there 
were no circumstances under which Chesapeake would 
ever owe Additional Consideration. Accordingly, the 
district court’s interpretation of the agreement rendered 
the one-year deadline and the negotiated amount of 
additional compensation superfluous.78 
 
The Fourth Circuit also found the use of the word “within” significant:  
 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 395–96. 
 75. Id. at 396. 
 76. Id. at 397. 
 77. Id. at 396. 
 78. Id. at 397. 
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The primary definition of the word ‘within’ is ‘inside, 
enclosed by.’ The use of the word ‘within’ in the context 
of time computation requires two boundary points, 
together framing a time period ‘inside’ of which or 
‘enclosed by’ which the relevant events must occur. Had 
the parties intended that the wells could be commenced 
at any time prior to October 29, 2013, the [s]ettlement 
[a]greement likely would have said so.79 
E. Northern District Construes Wellbore Conveyance 
In Mountaineer Minerals, LLC v. Antero Resources Corp., the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia held that a 
conveyance of two specific wells, “and any and all leasehold rights 
associated therewith,” conveyed “leasehold rights only insofar as 
those rights pertained to those specific [a]ssigned [w]ells.” The parties 
to the case disputed whether the conveyance of “any and all leasehold 
rights associated” with the specifically enumerated shallow wells 
included the leasehold rights associated with the Marcellus shale.80 In 
holding that the conveyance was limited to those rights pertaining to 
the specifically enumerated wells, the court noted that its reasoning 
was bolstered by the assignment’s mention of specific obligations 
related to the wells, including the obligation to pay royalty, and the 
assignee’s right to produce and operate the assigned wells.81 
F. Northern District Emphasizes Pleading Requirements for 
Breach of Lease Actions 
In Langford v. Antero Resources Corp., Judge Keeley granted, in 
part, a motion to dismiss where the lessor-plaintiffs failed “to 
adequately plead the elements of [a] breach of contract claim” related 
to a lease with Antero Resources. The plaintiffs alleged that Antero 
failed to properly pay the royalty by deducting certain costs and 
expenses from the royalty in contravention of the lease terms.82 After 
noting that the plaintiffs failed to attach the leases at issue to the 
complaint, Judge Keeley held:  
 
 
 79. Id. at 397–98. 
 80. Mountaineer Minerals, LLC v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:16CV28, 2019 WL 
5727589, at *1, *5 (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 5, 2019). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Langford v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:19CV178, 2020 WL 608285, at *1 
(N.D. W.Va. Feb. 7, 2020). 
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The [p]laintiffs’ [c]omplaint fails to adequately 
identify their oil and gas interests in the subject 
property. It does not identify or explain the parties’ 
obligations under the various contracts and 
modifications at issue, and it fails to allege how Antero 
even acquired its alleged interests, if any, in the subject 
leases. In addition, the [c]omplaint fails to allege 
whether the [p]laintiffs have performed their 
obligations under the contracts, and fails to identify the 
specific contract provisions Antero breached.83 
 
Langford highlights the importance of pleading with specificity in 
federal court. 
G. Northern District Certifies Lessor Class Action Against Antero 
In Romeo v. Antero Resources Corp., Judge Keely certified a class 
of royalty owners who alleged that Antero improperly deducted post-
production costs and failed to pay royalties on the basis of the price 
received at the point of sale.84 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought 
certification of a class that included those with leases that required 
Antero to do the following: 
(a) to pay monthly Lessors’ proportionate share of the 
one-eighth [] of the value at the well of the gas from 
each and every gas well drilled on said premises, 
the product from which is marketed and used off 
the premises . . . or  
(b) to pay Lessor as royalty for the native gas from 
each and every well drilled on said premise[s] 
producing native gas, as amount equal to one-
eighth [] of the gross proceeds received from the 
sale of the same at the prevailing price for gas sold 
at the well, for all native gas saved and marketed 
from the said premises, payable quarterly.85 
Without determining the merits of the claim, Judge Keeley determined 
that the proposed class satisfied the four requirements of Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(a) (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
 
 83. Id. at *2–3. 
 84. Romeo v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:17CV88, 2020 WL 1430468, at *1 (N.D. 
W.Va. Mar. 23, 2020). 
 85. Id. at *7. 
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adequacy of representation) and the three requirements of Rule 23(b) 
(predominance, superiority, and ascertainability).86  
Judge Keeley “readily conclude[d]” that the numerosity 
requirement was satisfied because counsel for the plaintiffs identified 
over 700 individuals or entities with lease language identical to that of 
the proposed class representatives.87 Judge Keeley also determined 
that Antero did not significantly contest the adequacy of 
representation and that the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a) is 
“subsumed under, or superseded by, the more stringent Rule 23(b)(3) 
requirement that questions common to the class predominate over 
other questions.”88 Judge Keeley also found that the proposed class 
demonstrated typicality despite significant possible differences in 
individual claims: 
 
Although their claims may differ factually because gas 
was extracted from different wells, gas was sold at 
different points of sale, gas was transported to different 
locations, gas was processed or unprocessed, or Antero 
took different types of deductions for post-production 
expenses, the representative Plaintiffs’ claims all arise 
from the same practice or course of conduct and are 
based on the same legal theory. Indeed, all of the 
breach of contract claims are based on the theory that 
Antero has been unlawfully deducting post-production 
expenses from the Plaintiffs’ royalty payments. And 
although the Plaintiffs’ damages may vary based on the 
amount and frequency of Antero’s allegedly unlawful 
deductions, the class representatives and class 
members need not have suffered identical injuries or 
damages.89 
 
Judge Keeley also concluded that the proposed class satisfied the 
predominance, superiority, and ascertainability requirements of Rule 
23(b). As to predominance, Judge Keeley identified four common 
questions of law and fact that “far outweigh the dissimilarities in 
damages among class members that likely will require individualized 
inquires.” The four common questions included: 
 
 86. Id. at *8–13. 
 87. Id. at *8.  
 88. Id. at *8. 
 89. Id. at *9 (internal quotations omitted). 
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(1) Do Wellman90 and Tawney91 apply to both market value and 
proceeds leases?  
(2) If so, do the leases at issue, as modified by any subsequent 
modifications (if any), have the specific language required by 
Wellman and Tawney that would allow Antero to deduct post-
production expenses from the Plaintiffs’ royalty payments? 
(3) If not, did Antero unlawfully deduct post-production expenses 
from the Plaintiffs’ royalty payments?  
(4) If so, how did Antero calculate these deductions?92 
Finally, and given the pervasiveness of common questions of law and 
fact, Judge Keeley found that a class action was superior to individual 
litigation and that the class was ascertainable through Antero’s 
accounting system and summary royalty reports.93 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the next year, the Northern District may opine on whether 
Wellman and Tawney apply to both market value and proceeds lease—
an issue that will significantly affect both lessor and lessee interests in 
West Virginia. Further, the Supreme Court of Appeals decision in 
Pachira may spur similar litigation related to whether areas of mutual 
interest create partnership assets—and also fiduciary duties—in other 
jurisdictions. Finally, the legislature is expected to again be active with 
respect to oil and gas issues in 2020. Bills that ultimately did not pass 
in 2020, including those related to the tax treatment of natural 




 90. Wellman v. Energy Res., Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2001). 
 91. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Nat. Res., LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006). 
 92. Romeo, 2020 WL 1430468, at *10. 
 93. Id. at *12–13. 
